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THE LAW AND ETHICS OF TRADE SECRETS:
A CASE STUDY
KURT M. SAUNDERS*
"[Niothing is secret, that shall not be made manifest....,
ABSTRACT
Almost every business owns proprietary information that adds
value and provides a competitive advantage because the information is
not known to the business's competitors. Trade secret law protects
such information from theft or unauthorized disclosure. Because one
of the principal policies underlying trade secret law is the maintenance
of standards of commercial ethics, trade secrets are a rich source of
material for exploring questions of business ethics alongside the law.
This pedagogical case study offers a means to examine the legal and
ethical issues involving the protection and misappropriation of trade
secrets within the business environment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Decisions made by business managers are never made in an ethi-
cal vacuum; usually such decisions have a wide-reaching impact on
shareholders, employees, consumers, communities, and other busi-
nesses. This case study provides a means to integrate the study of
trade secret law with business ethics.' Trade secrets are a form of in-
. Associate Professor and Chair, Department of Business Law, California State Univer-
sity, Northridge.
1. Luke 8:17 (King James).
2. For discussions of the normative foundations of trade secret law, see Robert G. Bone,
A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CAL. L. REv. 241
(1998); Vincent Chiappetta, Myth, Chameleon or Intellectual Property Olympian? A Norma-
tive Framework Supporting Trade Secret Law, 8 GEO. MASON L. REv. 69 (1999).
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tellectual property3 and can consist of "any information that can be
used in the operation of a business ... and that is sufficiently valuable
and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over
others."4  Trade secret law differs from other forms of intellectual
property law because it does not impose liability for mere unauthor-
ized use; rather, the defendant must have improperly used, acquired,
or disclosed the trade secret as a result of some wrongful or unethical
conduct, such as by theft, fraud, or breach of a confidential duty.' In-
deed, the U.S. Supreme Court has explained that one of the principal
policies underlying trade secret law is "[t]he maintenance of standards
of commercial ethics."
6
At least as far back as the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, rules
have existed to protect guilds and other businesses against those who
used their ideas and processes without permission.7 Today, trade se-
crets are valuable assets for businesses of all types and sizes.8 Indeed,
the very survival of a business may depend on its ability to maintain
3. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984) ("With respect to a
trade secret, the right to exclude others is central to the very definition of the property inter-
est.").
4. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995).
5. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985); infra notes 52-54 and ac-
companying text.
6. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974); see also E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1970) ("[O]ur devotion to free
wheeling industrial competition must not force us into accepting the law of the jungle as the
standard of morality expected in our commercial relations."); Ed Nowogroski Ins., Inc. v.
Rucker, 971 P.2d 936, 942 (Wash. 1999) ("A purpose of trade secrets law is to maintain and
promote standards of commercial ethics and fair dealing in protecting those secrets."); Abbott
Labs. v. Norse Chem. Corp., 147 N.W.2d 529, 533 (Wis. 1967) ("The basis of [trade secret
law] is an attempt to enforce morality in business."); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt., 14
U.L.A. 433 (1985) ("One of the broadly stated policies behind trade secret law is 'the mainte-
nance of standards of commercial ethics."'); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b
(1939) ('The protection is merely against breach of faith and reprehensible means of learning
another's secret."). For a discussion on the use of trade secret law to enforce commercial
ethical conduct, see Don Wiesner & Anita Cava, Stealing Trade Secrets Ethically, 47 MD. L.
REv. 1076 (1988).
7. See S. R. Epstein, Craft Guilds, Apprenticeship, and Technological Change in Prein-
dustrial Europe, 58 J. ECON. HIST. 684, 691-94 (1998). For further discussion of the historical
origins of trade secrecy, see CARLO M. CIPOLLA, BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL REvOLuTION:
EUROPEAN SOCIETY AND ECONOMY, 1000-1700 (2d ed. 1980).
8. See, e.g., Edwin Fraumann & Joseph Koletar, Trade Secret Safeguards, SECURITY
MGMT., Mar. 1999, at 63-66. Most people are familiar with the famous formulas used to
make Coca-Cola and Kentucky Fried Chicken, both of which have been successfully pro-
tected as trade secrets for many decades. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107
F.R.D. 288, 289 (D. Del. 1985) ("The complete formula for Coca-Cola is one of the best-kept
trade secrets in the world."); see also About KFC: Original Recipe® Is Still a Secret,
http://www.kfc.com/about/secret.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2005).
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the secrecy of its proprietary information. 9 One study estimated a
typical business may derive seventy percent or more of its value from
its intellectual property.' ° Theft and improper disclosure of trade se-
crets can be costly. Between 1992 and 1995, trade secret theft result-
ing from industrial espionage increased more than three hundred per-
cent, with losses exceeding $1.5 billion in 1995." Once a trade secret
has been disclosed, even if inadvertently, its owner may lose all pro-
tection, no matter how much was invested in its creation. 12
There have been numerous recent and well-publicized instances of
trade secret misappropriation involving information technologies. 3
The extent to which business managers might decide to appropriate or
disclose another's trade secret may depend on several factors, includ-
ing whether: (1) they might get caught and punished, (2) they are
harming an individual or entity, (3) the trade secret owner has done
anything perceived to be wrong, (4) others have acted improperly as
well, (5) the business will benefit from the action, and (6) whether the
benefit outweighs the harm to the owner. Nevertheless, investors pay
a price when it comes to light that businesses have engaged in illegal
9. See Fraumann & Koletar, supra note 8, at 63. "Most businesses do not realize the
importance of determining what proprietary information qualifies as a trade secret.... [A]
company's portfolio of trade secrets changes constantly." Id.
10. ASIS INT'L, TRENDS IN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Loss 3 (2002), available at
http://www.asisonline.org/newsroom/surveys/spi2.pdf.
11. Janet S. Greenlee & Michael Castelluccio, "Spies Like Them": How to Protect Your
Company from Industrial Spies, 78 MGMT. ACCT. 31, 31 (1996).
12. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § I cmt., 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985); see also Warner-
Lambert Pharm. Co. v. John J. Reynolds, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 655, 659, 665-66 (S.D.N.Y.
1959), affid, 280 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1960) (holding that although publication of the Listerine
secret formula in a medical journal terminated protection; however, a company was still re-
quired to pay royalties to the inventor under the terms of their contract); Precision Moulding
& Frame, Inc. v. Simpson Door Co., 888 P.2d 1239, 1243 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (holding
that trade secret protection terminates when the owner fails to take reasonable measures to
maintain secrecy).
13. E.g., Cameron W. Barr, Comcast Files Suit Against Ex-Manager, WASH. POST, Aug.
18, 2005, at B7; Nancy Rivera Brooks, The Often-Thin Line Between Cheating and Compet-
ing, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1997, at D2; Patrick Danner, Applica Files Against Yahoo Posters,
MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 16, 2005, available at http://www.miami.corn/mld/miamiher-
ald/12391801.htm; Sarah Karush, Compuware and IBM Settle, Ending Federal Trial,
DETROIT FREE PRESS, Mar. 22, 2005, available at http://www.freep.com/news/latest-
news/pm334120050322.htm; Stefanie Olsen, Cadence, Avant Settle Trade-Secret Suit,
NEWS.CoM, Nov. 14, 2002, http://news.com.com/2102-1023_3-965890.html; Stephen
Swoyer, Cisco Wins Settlement in Intellectual Property Case, CERTCITIES.COM, Sept. 13,
2004, http://www.certcities.corn/editorial/news/story.asp?EditorialslD=694; Jim Wagner, Ap-
ple Wins Subpoena in Trade Secrets Case, INTERNETNEWS.COM, Mar. 11, 2005,
http://www.internetnews.com/bus-news/article.php/3489606; Wal-Mart Files Trade-Secrets
Lawsuit Against Former Computer Worker, ABC NEWS, Feb. 18, 2005, available at
http://www.abcnews. go.com/Business/wireStory?id=513451.
2006]
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or unethical activities. 14 The results of one study indicate the stock
market "react[s] negatively to the release of news of firm illegality."' 5
While some trade secret cases involve industrial espionage or
theft by competitors, the majority of cases have arisen in the context
of departing employees accused of stealing proprietary information
from their former employers. 6 Overall social welfare is enhanced
when individuals are encouraged to acquire knowledge and practice
useful skills where they are in demand. 7 On the other hand, employ-
ers who have invested valuable time and resources in developing pro-
prietary information will no longer continue to do so if there is no as-
surance of confidentiality by departing employees. 8  When the
available employee pool is limited or highly mobile, as is the case
with advanced technologies prone to rapid rates of obsolescence, firms
will have a greater incentive to hire away key employees from com-
petitors. 19 Situations in which courts balance a reluctance to restrain
employee mobility against the protection of confidential employer as-
sets20 provide fertile ground for examining the ethical responsibilities
of the parties involved.
The following case study offers a means to examine the legal and
ethical issues involving the protection and misappropriation of trade
secrets. Part II presents a hypothetical case for discussion. Part III of-
14. See Wallace N. Davidson II et al., Stock Market Reactions to Announced Corporate
Illegalities, 13 J. Bus. ETmcs 979, 985 (1994).
15. Id. ("Although there were insignificant stock market effects for the whole sample,
specific types of crimes such as bribery, tax evasion, theft of trade secrets, financial reporting
violations and the violation of government contracts were associated with negative abnormal
stock returns.").
16. For a collection of trade secrets cases arising from the employer-employee relation-
ships, see ROGER MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 5.02(1) (2005).
17. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 364 (2003).
18. See id.
19. See Ann C. Hodges & Porcher L. Taylor, II, The Business Falloutfrom the Rapid
Obsolescence and Planned Obsolescence of High-Tech Products: Downsizing of Noncompeti-
tion Agreements, 6 COLUM. SC. & TECH. L. REv. 3 (2005) (discussing the willingness of
courts to enforce noncompetition agreements in high technology industries); Felix Prandl,
Damages for Misappropriation of Trade Secret, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 447, 456 (1987) ("Trade
secret litigation has become an. important factor of competition in certain areas of business,
such as the high-tech or the chemical industry."); see also Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infra-
structure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants
Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 586-92 (1999) (describing the high level of high
technology employee mobility in the Boston and Silicon Valley regions); Tamara Loomis,
Non-Compete Pacts: Whether These Agreements Hold up Is Uncertain, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 24,
2000, at 5 (noting that the annual employee turnover in high technology industries had dou-
bled over five years to twenty percent).
20. See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 42
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fers questions to stimulate and direct discussion. Part IV includes an
overview of trade secret law, including readings to provide founda-
tional material on the law of trade secrets. Part V discusses four major
ethical theories to serve as an analytical framework for the analysis of
the case study. In Part VI, a teaching note provides pedagogical ob-
jectives as well as suggestions for the use of the case and additional
questions for discussion. The case study concludes by offering an op-
portunity to assess legal, ethical, and managerial aspects of protecting
and using trade secrets.21
II. THE CASE STUDY
Jeremy Hart was a software engineer employed by Citadel Sys-
tems, Inc. (Citadel), a leading software and database applications de-
veloper. His colleagues and supervisor considered him one of the
brightest and most insightful employees working with database appli-
cations. For the past several years, he was a member of a research
team designing a sophisticated new database management system. In
the course of building and refining its database management tools,
Citadel developed unique protocols to solve a variety of technical
problems. These protocols were not widely known or easily observ-
able by Citadel's customers and competitors. Late last year, rumors
began circulating within the software design industry that the team
was nearing completion of a beta version of the system. Although this
rumor was not quite true, after following a few unsuccessful design
blind alleys, Hart's team made several breakthroughs to solve security
and data manipulation problems arising with large databases that store
multiple levels of information and are simultaneously accessible and
used by hundreds of users. During his work on the project, Hart also
acquired additional experience, skills, and insights into system design,
database coordination, research methodology, and team interaction.
Northwell Networks, Inc. (Northwell) is Citadel's largest com-
petitor. Several of Northwell's employees were acquainted with Hart
and were aware of the nature of his work at Citadel. A few months
ago, the head of Northwell's research division approached Hart and
offered him a position with a higher salary, leadership opportunities,
and a better benefits package than he had at Citadel. No mention was
21. For a discussion about the use of cases to discuss law, ethics, and strategic man-
agement, see Louis B. BARNES ET AL., TEACHING AND THE CASE METHOD (3d ed. 1994);
ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS 41-42 (Tom L. Beauchamp & Norman E. Bowie eds., 7th ed.
2004); Anne Lawton, Using a Management Driven Model to Teach Business Law, 15 J.
LEGAL STUD. EDUC. 211 (1997).
2006]
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made of Hart's work on Citadel's database management system. Af-
ter careful consideration, Hart accepted the offer and was immediately
appointed the head of a research team designing a system very similar
to the one he had worked on at Citadel. When he departed Citadel,
Hart kept copies of his notes made during his work on the database
management system. Although Hart was not required to sign a non-
disclosure agreement regarding his work at Citadel, on several occa-
sions Citadel research and development managers reminded him and
other employees that their work was not to be discussed outside of the
workplace.
In his work at Northwell, Hart was confronted with many new
challenges, but some were the same issues and problems he faced at
Citadel. He applied his skills and experience to resolve the new prob-
lems, but when it came to problems he had already encountered at
Citadel, he sometimes found the approach Northwell intended to pur-
sue less efficient or more inconclusive than what he learned at Citadel.
In those instances, he often steered his team toward the solution he
had already discovered. At lunch with his supervisor one day, Hart
casually mentioned that in reviewing his old notes from Citadel he ob-
served Citadel's progress on a new database management system was
further along than Northwell's. At this point, Hart's supervisor sug-
gested he could probably earn the gratitude of upper management, as
well as a large bonus, if he shared those notes with his team to speed
up their work on the new system. When Hart resisted, his supervisor
pressed, "Don't ever forget, you're a Northwell employee now. Your
loyalty and best efforts belong to Northwell, not our chief competitor.
All I can say is that if you still feel obligated to Citadel, then you
won't get far at Northwell." After pondering their conversation for a
few days, Hart turned over his notes to his supervisor.
Eventually, both Citadel and Northwell marketed large database
management products that were noticeably similar in their quality, so-
phistication, functionality, and performance. Not long afterwards,
Citadel managers started hearing industry gossip about Hart's role in
developing and refining Northwell's system.
III. DIscusSION QUESTIONS
1. Is trade secret law justifiable from the perspective of the
public interest?
2. Based on the facts provided above, does Citadel have a
protectable trade secret in any information? Was the in-
[Vol. 42
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formation of value? Did Citadel take reasonable measures
to maintain secrecy of the information?
3. If Northwell applied Citadel's confidential information in
developing its new system, what is the likelihood Citadel
can successfully sue Northwell for trade secret misappro-
priation?
4. If Citadel brings suit for misappropriation, does Northwell
have any potential defenses or counterarguments to such a
claim?
5. Is it possible Northwell has violated the Economic Espio-
nage Act? What does the government have to prove to es-
tablish such a violation?
6. Did Northwell act ethically in hiring Hart? Is it ethical for
a new employer to hire a competitor's former employee
when the employee has knowledge of the former em-
ployer's trade secrets? How could Northwell avoid incur-
ring liability for misappropriation by hiring Hart?
7. Did Hart act ethically in accepting a position with North-
well? How likely would you be to accept Northwell's
employment offer under the same circumstances? Would
it matter if your willingness to disclose your previous em-
ployer's proprietary information increased or decreased
your chances to be hired or promoted by Northwell?
8. How likely would you be to share proprietary information
you learned at Citadel with a new employer in order to
improve the development of your current employer's new
product? Does it matter whether you contributed to devel-
oping the information while at Citadel?
9. Given the potential for detection and litigation, how does a
business arrive at and justify a decision to misappropriate
a competitor's trade secrets from an ethical standpoint?
10. What could Citadel have done to prevent the theft or dis-
closure of its trade secrets by departing employees? What
should any business do to protect its trade secrets?
IV. OVERVIEW OF TRADE SECRET LAW
Protecting trade secrets is important to encourage innovation and
technological development by assuring the inventor or creator that he
or she will have the first chance to reap the benefits of the invest-
20061
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ment.22 As the Supreme Court explained, "[t]rade secret law promotes
the sharing of knowledge, and the efficient operation of industry; it
permits the individual inventor to reap the rewards of his labor by con-
tracting with a company large enough to develop and exploit it."' 23 In
doing so, trade secret law protects an economic investment against
"free riders" by discouraging unfair competition by those who might
otherwise attempt to gain unauthorized access to and use of the infor-
mation through improper means. 24
Many small businesses rely entirely on trade secret law to protect
such intangible proprietary assets, such as manufacturing processes,
business systems, customer lists, formulas, and databases. 25 Trade se-
crets are protected primarily by state law.26 The material in this sec-
tion draws upon the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA),27 a uniform
law now adopted by forty-four states and the District of Columbia, to
define the scope of trade secret protection.28 Particular attention
22. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974).
23. Id.
24. See Eden Hannon& Co. v. Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co., 914 F.2d 556, 561 (4th
Cir. 1990). For an economic analysis of trade secret law, see LANDES & POSNER, supra note
18, at 354-71; see also Steven N. S. Cheung, Property Rights in Trade Secrets, 20 EcoN.
INQUIRY 40 (1982); David D. Friedman et al., Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J.
ECON. PERSP. 61 (1991); Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable
Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683 (1980).
25. See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 29 (3d ed. 2003) ("[Tlrade secrets, though important to all firms, are
absolutely crucial for the small companies that drive innovation in many developing fields.").
26. See id.
27. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985). Trade secret protection, in
one form or another, exists in most countries. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) provides international protection for intellectual property
rights, including protection of "undisclosed information." Agreement on Trade-Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 39, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establish-
ing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay
Round, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement]. Such information must (1) not
be "generally known among or readily accessible to persons within the circles that normally
deal with the kind of information in question;" (2) have "commercial value because it is se-
cret;" and (3) be "subject to reasonable steps" by its owners to keep it secret. Id. The TRIPs
Agreement requires Member States to protect "undisclosed information" against use by others
without the consent of the owner if the use is "contrary to honest commercial practices." Id.
Additionally, there is third-party liability for misappropriation if third parties knew or were
grossly negligent in not knowing that such information had been obtained dishonestly. Id.
n. 10. The TRIPs Agreement also requires Member States to provide effective remedies for
trade secret misappropriation, including injunctive relief, monetary damages, and provisional
relief to prevent misappropriation and to preserve evidence. See id arts. 44-46.
28. See ALA. CODE §§ 8-27-1 to -6 (2005); ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.50.910-.945 (2006);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-401 to -407 (2005); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-75-601 to -607 (2005);
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3426.1-.11 (Deering 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-74-101 to -110 (2005);
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-50 to -58 (2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2001-2009 (2005); D.C.
CODE §§ 36-401 to -410 (2005); FLA. STAT. §§ 688.001-.009 (2005); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-
8
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should be paid to the requirements for trade secret protection and the
conduct by which misappropriation can occur.
A. Definition of Trade Secret
The law of trade secrets provides a structure and incentive for en-
couraging innovation. 29  The initial step to securing trade secrets
against theft or disclosure is to identify what subject matter can be
protected.30 According to the UTSA, a
"[t]rade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern,
comnpilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that:(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertain-
able by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic
value from its disclosure or use, and(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circum-
stances to maintain its secrecy.3'
Courts have found many tangible objects and intangible ideas to
be trade secrets, including chemical formulas, recipes, procedures,
customer and supplier lists, flow-charts, blueprints, quality control
760 to -767 (2005); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 482B-1 to -9 (2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 48-801 to -
807 (2005); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1065/1-/9 (2005); IND. CODE §§ 24-2-3-1 to -8 (2005); IOWA
CODE §§ 550.1-.8 (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3320 to -3330 (2005); KY. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 365.880-.900 (LexisNexis 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1431-:1439 (2005); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1541-1548 (2005); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 11-1201 to -1209
(West 2005); MIcH. COMp. LAWS §§ 445.1901-.1910 (2005); MINN. STAT. §§ 325C.01-.08
(2005); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-26-1 to -19 (2006); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 417.450-.467 (2006);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-401 to -409 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 87-501 to -507 (2005);
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 600A.010-.100 (2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 350-B:1-:9 (2005); N.M.
STAT. §§ 57-3A-1 to -7 (2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-152 to -157 (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 47-25.1-01 to -08 (2005); Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1333.61-.69 (LexisNexis 2006); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 78, §§ 85-94 (2005); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.461-.475 (2003); 12 PA. CONS. STAT. §§
5301-5308 (2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-41-1 to -11 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-8-10 to -
130 (2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 37-29-1 to -11 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-24-1 to -9
(2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 523 (2005); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-336 to -343 (2005);
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.108.010-.940 (2005); W. VA. CODE §§ 47-22-1 to -10 (2005); WiS.
STAT. § 134.90 (2005).
29. Cf. Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 10 (1913). The Patent Act "was passed
for the purpose of encouraging useful invention and promoting new and useful improvements
by the protection and stimulation thereby given to inventive genius, and was intended to se-
cure to the public, after the lapse of the exclusive privileges granted, the benefit of such in-
ventions and improvements." Id.
30. Fraumann & Koletar, supra note 8, at 63.
31. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985). The information must be
"sufficiently valuable ... to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995); see also Metallurgical Indus.
Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1201 (5th Cir. 1986) (discussing an example of what is
considered valuable information sufficient to be a trade secret).
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data, techniques, designs, business plans, forecasts, know-how,3 2 and
just about any other type of nonpublic information that provides a
competitive advantage to its owner.33 Even if constituent components
of the information are publicly available, their particular combination
may nevertheless be protected as a trade secret.3 4 Generally ascertain-
able knowledge and information that can be independently discovered
or recreated upon inspection is not protected,35 nor is an employee's
aptitude, skill, experience, manual and mental ability, and other sub-
jective knowledge an employee obtained in the course of employ-
ment.36  Separating proprietary information from an employee's un-
protectable knowledge, experience, and skills is sometimes difficult,
particularly when the employee's knowledge or skills are superior or
unique.37 In these instances, the interests of employee mobility and
the ability of departing employees to exploit their valuable knowledge
and enhanced skills is at odds with an employer's interest in prevent-
ing competitors from exploiting its proprietary information and in-
vestment in employee training and development.38 Here, the issue
amounts to whether the employee's knowledge, experience, and skills
are similar to those possessed by others working in the industry or
whether the knowledge and skills are generally known or readily as-
certainable by competitors through inspection.
32. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2000); Metallurgical Indus., 790 F.2d at 1201 (quoting
Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 314 S.W.2d 763, 776 (Tex. 1958)); Sims v. Mack Truck Corp., 488
F. Supp. 592, 601 (E.D. Pa. 1980); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § I cmt. ("The words 'method,
technique' are intended to include the concept of 'know-how."'). There is no requirement
that information exist in a tangible form, nor is there any requirement that the trade secret be
in continuous use. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. The use of a trade secret could be
a one-time occurrence, such as information related to a corporate merger. STEPHEN M.
MCJOHN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 296 (2003).
33. See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. UGI Corp., 731 F.2d 1186, 1191 (5th Cir. 1984)
(finding marketing information and strategies protectable as trade secrets); Telex Corp. v.
Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 928-29 (10th Cir. 1975) (finding computer hardware
to be a protectable trade secret); On-Line Techs., Inc. v. Perkin-Elmer Corp., 252 F. Supp. 2d
313, 323-24 (D. Conn. 2003) (stating that using the trade secret in research and development
plans and reports constitutes use of the trade secret).
34. E.g., Rohm & Haas Co. v. Adco Chem. Co., 689 F.2d 424, 433 (3d Cir. 1982) (ad-
dressing misappropriation of a latex paint-making process by a former employee who went to
work for a competitor).
35. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § I cmt.
36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 cmt. d (1995); see, e.g., CVD,
Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842, 852 (1st Cir. 1985); Fleming Sales Co. v. Bailey, 611 F.
Supp. 507, 514 (N.D. 111. 1985); Sims, 488 F. Supp. at 600.
37. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 cmt. d (1995).
38. Cf CVD, 769 F.2d at 852 (stating that allowing a departing employee to take gen-
eral knowledge and experience "effectuates the public interest in labor mobility, promotes the
employee's freedom to practice a profession, and freedom of competition").
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For information to be protected as a trade secret, it must be known
only by its owner and those the owner has authorized to know.3 9 The
trade secret must have economic value because it is not generally
known and is not easily discoverable by proper means.4' Value might
be measured by what the information yielded, such as increased mar-
ket share, profits, or enhanced production efficiency, or by the amount
invested in developing the information.41 Information is known or
readily ascertainable if it is available in publications such as trade
journals, public records, or other sources accessible through proper
means.42 If the information's economic value results from its confi-
dentiality, the owner must make efforts to maintain its secrecy.43 Ab-
solute secrecy of the information is not required; rather, the owner
need only use those efforts reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain secrecy and ensure that the information does not become
generally known.' Such efforts might include physical measures to
restrict access to the information and other policies that stress the con-
fidential nature of the information.45 Reasonable efforts to maintain
secrecy "do not require that extreme and unduly expensive procedures
be taken to protect trade secrets against flagrant industrial espio-
nage."'46 "On the other hand, public disclosure of information through
display, trade journal publications, advertising, or other carelessness
can preclude protection. 47
In determining whether the precautions used were reasonable, no
one set of measures will guarantee the secrecy requirement is met.
The standard is flexible and courts consider all relevant facts in de-
termining whether the business has utilized reasonable measures.48
39. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2).
40. Id. § 1(4)(i).
41. See MCJOHN, supra note 32, at 295.
42. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985).
43. Id. § 1(4)(ii).
44. Id. § 1 cmt. The requisite efforts taken to maintain secrecy will differ depending on
the size of the business and the nature of the information to be protected. See Jermaine S.
Grubbs, Comment, Give the Little Guys Equal Opportunity at Trade Secret Protection: Why
the "Reasonable Efforts" Taken by Small Businesses Should Be Analyzed Less Stringently, 9
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 421, 423 (2005); see also David W. Slaby et al., Trade Secret Pro-
tection: An Analysis of the Concept "Efforts Reasonable Under the Circumstances to Main-
tain Secrecy," 5 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 321, 322 (1989). Although
evaluated within the circumstances of the business, the courts are clear that a trade secret
owner must apply definite and affirmative measures to ensure secrecy. See 2 STEVEN C.
ALBERTY, ADVISING SMALL BUSINESSES § 34:14.25 (1997 & Supp. 2001).
45. ALBERTY, supra note 44, § 34:14.25.
46. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt.
47. Id.
48. See ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW
21920061
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Furthermore, absolute secrecy would not be possible in many busi-
nesses because employees may actively use the trade secret informa-
tion during the course of business. Employers have a clear business
interest in protecting trade secrets disclosed in confidence to an em-
ployee during the course of his or her employment, especially when
the employee held a position of trust and responsibility. This is true
even when there is no confidentiality agreement between the parties;
employees have a duty of confidentiality when they expressly or im-
pliedly consent to such a duty or knew or should have known of a con-
fidential obligation.49 Nevertheless, "reasonable efforts to maintain
secrecy have been held to include advising employees of the existence
of a trade secret, limiting access to a trade secret on [a] 'need to know
basis,' and controlling plant access. ' '50
B. Trade Secret Misappropriation
A claim for trade secret misappropriation arises when one ac-
quires, uses, or discloses the information through improper means,
which involve a breach of contract or confidential relationship or other
wrongful or commercially unethical conduct." According to the
UTSA,
"Misappropriation" means:(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who
knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by
improper means; or(ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express
or implied consent by a person who(A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade
secret; or(B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to
know that his knowledge of the trade secret was
(I) derived from or through a person who had utilizedimproper means to acquire it;(II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty
to maintairi its secrecy or limit its use; or(11) derived from or through a person who owed a duty
to the person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit
its use; or
OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS § 24.2.1 (2003).
49. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917).
50. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt.
51. Id. § 1.
[Vol. 42220
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(C) before a material change of his [or her] position knew
or had reason to know that it was a trade secret and that knowl-
edge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake.
52
Proving misappropriation involves a fact-intensive analysis. Mis-
appropriation by way of wrongful conduct does not only involve tor-
tious, criminal, or otherwise unlawful acts,53 but it can also include
acts that violate the prevailing norms of business ethics. Further,
"'improper means' includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach
or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage
through electronic or other means."54 The boundary between proper
and improper means of acquiring competitive intelligence is the focus
of most trade secret litigation and ethical dilemmas.55
Disclosing or using another's trade secret without permission is
the other manner of misappropriation defined by the UTSA.56 In this
manner of misappropriation, the defendant may have used or disclosed
information he or she acquired wrongfully or knew was acquired
wrongfully by someone else.57 Alternatively, the defendant may have
used or disclosed another's trade secret that he or she obtained from a
person who breached a duty of confidentiality. The duty of confiden-
tiality may arise from an express duty not to disclose, found in a writ-
ten confidentiality agreement, or an implied duty not to disclose, from
an employment situation or similar relationship where the secret is re-
52. Id. § 1(2) (alteration in original).
53. See Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2000); UNIF.
TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7(b).
54. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1). "A complete catalogue of improper means is not
possible. In general they are means which fall below the generally accepted standards of
commercial morality and reasonable conduct." RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. f
(1939). Nevertheless, the UTSA includes a partial list of practices that are proper means:
Proper means include:
1. Discovery by independent invention;
2. Discovery by "reverse engineering", that is, by starting with the known prod-
uct and working backward to find the method by which it was developed. The
acquisition of the known product must, of course, also be by a fair and honest
means, such as purchase of the item on the open market for reverse engineering
to be lawful;
3. Discovery under a license from the owner of the trade secret;
4. Observation of the item in public use or on public display;
5. Obtaining the trade secret from published literature.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt.; see also William E. Hilton, What Sort of Improper Con-
duct Constitutes Misappropriation of a Trade Secret, 30 IDEA 287 (1990).
55. See Lynn Sharp Paine, Corporate Policy and the Ethics of Competitor Intelligence
Gathering, 10 J. Bus. ETHICS 423, 424-25 (1991).
56. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § l(2)(ii).
57. Id. § l(2)(ii)(A)-(B)(I).
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vealed for business purposes.58 Further, misappropriation may occur
when it is clear from the circumstances the owner revealed the trade
secret by mistake or accident.5 9
C. Defenses to Liability
Assuming the information is not otherwise publicly available and
reasonable means of secrecy have been used to protect the secret, a
trade secret owner's right to sue for misappropriation arises only when
the information has been wrongfully taken or disclosed.60 As a result,
one accused of trade secret misappropriation may escape civil liability
if he or she can demonstrate that the same information could have
been ascertained through proper means, such as independent discov-
ery or reverse engineering. 6' A trade secret does not vest in its owner
a right of exclusivity. 62 Others are free to arrive at precisely the same
information through independent creation or discovery and to use it so
long as they obtain their knowledge through their own independent ef-
forts. 63 Therefore, a person who independently invents or discovers
information identical to another's trade secret, without relying on im-
proper means to do so, is not liable for misappropriation. 4
Likewise, there is no liability for misappropriation if the trade se-
cret was ascertained by reverse engineering, the process of "starting
with the known product and working backward to find the method by
which it was developed. '65  Thus, the trade secret owner is always
58. See id. § l(2)(ii)(B)(II1).
59. Id. § 1(2)(ii)(C).
60. See id. § 1(2).
61. See id. § 1 cmt. (discussing proper means of acquiring a trade secret); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 cmt. a (1995) ("Protection is available
only against a wrongful acquisition, use, or disclosure of the trade secret.").
62. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 cmt. a (1995) ("The owner of
a trade secret does not have an exclusive right to possession or use of the secret informa-
tion.").
63. See id. § 43 cmt. b. Some courts hold that the trade secret owner has the burden of
proving the defendant did not independently develop the allegedly misappropriated trade se-
cret, though this is not the majority view. See Moore v. Kulicke & Sofa Indus., Inc., 318
F.3d 561, 572 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that the plaintiff has the burden of disproving independ-
ent discovery of the trade secret). But see 2 Louis ALTMAN, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR
COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 14.28 (4th ed. 2003) (stating that the burden
is on the defendant to prove independent discovery when the defendant had access to the trade
secret).
64. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 43 cmt. b (1995).
65. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. Reverse engineering is the process of "starting
with the known product and working backward to divine the process which aided in its devel-
opment or manufacture." Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974). Ironi-
[Vol. 42222
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vulnerable to the innocent discovery of the secret through proper
means, including reverse engineering.' However, courts have cau-
tioned that "[t]he more difficult, time consuming, and costly it would
be to develop the product, the less likely it can be considered to be
'reverse engineerable. ' ' 6' The reverse engineering defense is more
likely applied in cases involving publicly available products that con-
tain or embody the trade secret, especially those products that are easy
to disassemble and inspect.68
D. Remedies
The remedies available to a trade secret owner for misappropria-
tion include (1) injunctive relief, where courts delay use of the misap-
propriated information for a period of time;69 (2) monetary damages
representing profits lost by the trade secret owner and gained by the
defendant without the cost of independent development; 70 and (3)
where warranted, reasonable attorney's fees.7
Injunctions are appropriate for an actual or threatened misappro-
priation when monetary damages are inadequate and when a trade se-
cret may be destroyed by disclosure.7 2 The purpose of a preliminary
injunction is to prohibit the defendant's further use of the trade secret
and maintain the status quo between the parties until trial.7 3 The in-
junction will remain in place for only "as long as is necessary ... to
eliminate the commercial advantage or 'lead time' [over] good faith
competitors that a person has obtained through misappropriation. ''74
The injunction will "terminate when a former trade secret becomes ei-
ther generally known to good faith competitors or generally knowable
cally, it is possible that one owner of the trade secret might be unaware that the same informa-
tion is possessed and used by another, who also has an incentive to keep it secret. See UNIF.
TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (stating that proper means includes discovery by independent
invention).
66. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt.
67. Rycoline Products, Inc. v. Walsh, 756 A.2d 1047, 1055 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2000).
68. See DONALD S. CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW § 3E(3) (1992).
69. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2.
70. Id. § 3.
71. Id. §4.
72. See id. § 3(a). Moreover, under "exceptional circumstances," the court may condi-
tion future use of the trade secret on payment of a reasonable royalty for the time period dur-
ing which the defendant's use could have been prohibited. Id. § 2(b).
73. Hoechst Diafoil Co. v. Nan Ya Plastics Corp., 174 F.3d 411, 422 (4th Cir. 1999).
74. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2 cmt.
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to them because of the lawful availability of products that can be re-
verse engineered to reveal a trade secret. '75
Some courts apply the inevitable disclosure doctrine to enjoin a
former employee from working for a competitor.76 Under the inevita-
ble disclosure doctrine, even when there has been no actual misappro-
priation, a former employee will be prohibited from working for a
competitor when it is shown that the former employee cannot perform
his or her job without unavoidably using or disclosing a former em-
ployer's confidential and trade secret information.77 The inevitable
disclosure doctrine is controversial; not all courts apply it because it
involves balancing the employer's right to protect its investments and
trade secrets from competitors with the employee's right to freely
change jobs and use the skills, knowledge, and experience he or she
has gained over time.78
Trade secret owners may also recover monetary damages for ac-
tual losses and the disgorgement of revenues for unjust enrichment.79
Recovery of actual damages is proper only for the period the informa-
tion is entitled to trade secret protection, including any period the de-
75. Id. To exemplify this point,
assume that A has a valuable trade secret of which B and C, the other industry
members, are originally unaware. If B subsequently misappropriates the trade se-
cret and is enjoined from use, but C later lawfully reverse engineers the trade se-
cret, the injunction restraining B is subject to termination as soon as B's lead time
has been dissipated. All of the persons who could derive economic value from use
of the information are now aware of it, and there is no longer a trade secret .... It
would be anti-competitive to continue to restrain B after any lead time that B had
derived from misappropriation had been removed.
Id.
76. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995). For discussions
of the application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine, see Joseph F. Phillips, Inevitable Dis-
closure Through an Internet Lens: Is the Doctrine's Demise Truly Inevitable?, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 395 (2003); Elizabeth A. Rowe, When Trade Secrets Become Shackles: Fair-
ness and the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, 7 TuL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 167 (2005);
William Lynch Schaller, Trade Secret Inevitable Disclosure: Substantive, Procedural &
Practical Implications of an Evolving Doctrine (Part 1), 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
336 (2004); Adam Gill, Note, The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine: Inequitable Results Are
Threatened but Not Inevitable, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 403 (2002); Brandy L.
Treadway, Comment, An Overview of Individual States' Application of Inevitable Disclosure:
Concrete Doctrine or Equitable Tool?, 55 SMU L. REv. 621 (2002).
77. LeJeune v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 849 A.2d 451, 468 (Md. 2004). The inevitable
disclosure doctrine has been applied in a majority of other UTSA-adopting jurisdictions. See,
e.g., PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1269; RKI, Inc. v. Grimes, 177 F. Supp. 2d 859, 875-76 (N.D. Ill.
2001); H & R Block E. Tax Servs., Inc. v. Enchura, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1076 (W.D. Mo.
2000); Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1460 (M.D.N.C. 1996); Cardinal Freight
Carriers, Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transp. Servs., Inc., 987 S.W.2d 642, 646-47 (Ark. 1999); Procter
& Gamble Co. v. Stoneham, 747 N.E.2d 268, 279 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).
78. See Treadway, supra note 76, at 622.
79. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3.
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fendant had a competitive advantage and is thereby unjustly benefited
by the misappropriation.8" The court may award damages irrespective
of whether injunctive relief is granted.81 "A claim for actual damages
and net profits can be combined with a claim for injunctive relief.... 82
As an alternative method of measuring damages, the court may im-
pose a reasonable royalty for a defendant's unauthorized disclosure or
use of the trade secret if a reasonable royalty can be determined.83 A
reasonable royalty is a court-imposed licensing fee set at a fair market
rate.' Additionally, "[i]f (i) a claim of misappropriation is made in
bad faith, (ii) a motion to terminate an injunction is made or resisted in
bad faith, or (iii) willful and malicious misappropriation exists, the
court may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party."85
E. The Economic Espionage Act
In some instances, trade secret misappropriation may be prose-
cuted as a federal criminal offense.86 The federal Economic Espionage
80. Id. § 3 cmt. For cases from UTSA jurisdictions discussing the calculation of dam-
ages, see, for example, Roton Barrier, Inc. v. Stanley Works, 79 F.3d 1112, 1120 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (holding an award of actual damages proper when manufacturer lost market share, re-
duced its prices as a result of competitor's entry into market, and would need a substantial
period of time to reestablish prices and margins); Univ. Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown
Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 536 (5th Cir. 1974) (discussing lost profits, unjust enrichment, and rea-
sonable royalties as damages); Brown v. Rullam Enters., Inc., 44 S.W.3d 740, 744 (Ark. Ct.
App. 2001) (holding that the proper method of calculating damages is on the basis of net
profit, either lost by the injured party or gained by the wrongdoer); Kubik, Inc. v. Hull, 224
N.W.2d 80, 93-95 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974) (discussing injunctive relief).
81. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3 cmt.
82. Id. However, if both types of relief are granted, the injunction ordinarily will pre-
vent a monetary award for the time during which the injunction is in effect. d
83. Id. § 3.
84. See Univ. Computing, 504 F.2d at 536-39 ("[Mlost courts adjust the measure of
damages to accord with the commercial setting of the injury, the likely future consequences of
the misappropriation, and the nature and extent of the use the defendant put the trade secret to
after misappropriation.").
85. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 4. When considering whether to award attorney's fees
in cases involving willful and malicious misappropriation, "the court should take into consid-
eration the extent to which a complainant will recover exemplary damages in determining
whether additional attorney's fees should be awarded." Id. § 4 cmt. As to bad faith claims
and motions, courts have considered whether the plaintiff believed that there was a colorable
claim, whether the claim was vexatious or objectively specious, and whether the underlying
conduct was egregious. See, e.g., Contract Materials Processing, Inc. v. Kataleuna GmbH
Catalysts, 222 F. Supp. 2d 733, 744 (D. Md. 2002); Russo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 51 F.
Supp. 2d 70, 76 (D.R.I. 1999); Colorado Supply Co. v. Stewart, 797 P.2d 1303, 1308 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1990).
86. See Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2000). A number
of states also have criminal laws governing trade secret theft. See Eli Lederman, Criminal
Liability for Breach of Confidential Commercial Information, 38 EMORY L.J. 921 (1989)
(surveying state criminal laws addressing trade secrets).
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Act of 1996 (EEA)87 prohibits the theft of trade secrets,88 as well as
industrial espionage when the theft benefits a foreign government.8 9
The EEA definition of trade secret is similar to and as broad as the
UTSA' s definition.
bT]he term "trade secret" means all forms and types of financial,
usiness, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering informa-
tion, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, for-
mulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, proce-
dures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and
whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, elec-
tronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing if-
A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such
information secret; and
(B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to, and not Oeing readily
ascertainable through proper means by, the public ....
In determining secrecy, the information must "not be[] generally
known to, and not be[] readily ascertainable through proper means
by[] the public."'" This standard is more expansive than the UTSA,
which protects information deriving value "from not being generally
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by,
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or
use."92 Thus, the scope of protection is broader under the EEA since
87. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839. For more detailed analyses of the EEA, see COMPUTER
CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP, SECTION CRIMINAL Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES 179-229 (2001); Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Problematic
Role of Criminal Law in Regulating Use of Information: The Case of the Economic Espionage
Act, 80 N.C. L. REV. 853 (2002); Gerald J. Mossinghoff et al., The Economic Espionage Act:
A New Federal Regime of Trade Secret Protection, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 191
(1997); James H.A. Pooley et al., Understanding the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 5 TEx.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 177 (1997).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1832. For cases applying and interpreting the EEA, see, for example,
United States v. Lange, 312 F.3d 263 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Yang, 281 F.3d 534
(6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Krumrei, 258 F.3d 535 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Mar-
tin, 228 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1998).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 1831. In 1999, major U.S. corporations lost $45 billion in profits and
six million jobs due to industrial espionage by foreign governments. Robert C. Van Arnam,
Comment, Business War: Economic Espionage in the United States and the European Union
and the Need for Greater Trade Secret Protection, 27 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 95, 97-98
(2001).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3). Congress did not intend to include in this definition general
knowledge or skills learned on a job when an employee leaves one company and moves to
another in the same or similar field. H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 7 (1996), as reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 4026.
91. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B) (emphasis added).
92. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985) (emphasis added).
While the UTSA requires the information to be of value to others, the EEA merely requires
the information to be of value to the owner. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B), with UNIF.
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in many cases the general public will not easily know or learn about
confidential business information.
Under the EEA, it is a federal crime for any person to convert a
trade secret for his or her own benefit, or the benefit of others, intend-
ing or knowing the act will injure a trade secret owner. 93 For purposes
of the EEA, an owner is "the person or entity in whom or in which
rightful legal or equitable title to, or license in, the trade secret is re-
posed."94 More specifically, the EEA provides that a violation occurs
when a person or organization,
with intent to convert a trade secret, that is related to or included in
a product that is produced for or placed in interstate or foreign
commerce, to the economic benefit of anyone other than the owner
thereof, and intending or knowing that the offense will, injure any
owner of that trade secret, knowingly-(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries
away, or conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains such
information;
(2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, pho-
tographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, repli-
cates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys
such information;(3) receives, buys, or possesses such information, knowing the
same to have been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted
without authorization;
(4) attempts to commit any offense described in paragraphs (1)
through (3); or(5) conspires with one or more other persons to commit any offense
described in paragraphs (1) through (3), and one or more 9f such
persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy .... 5
TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a). The government does not have to prove the defendant defi-
nitely knew the information was a trade secret. "For a person to be prosecuted, the person
must know or have a firm belief that the information he or she is taking is in fact proprietary."
142 CONG. REc. S 12201, 12213 (1996). Evidence that a defendant knew the owner marked
the information "confidential" or "proprietary," restricted access to the information, and re-
quired personnel to sign non-disclosure agreements is solid proof of this element. See United
States v. Martin, 228 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2000). On the other hand, a person who takes a
trade secret because of ignorance, mistake, or accident, or who reasonably believes that the
information is not proprietary, is not liable under the EEA. See 18 U.S.C. § 1832.
94. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(4).
95. Id. § 1832(a)(1)-(5). The EEA requires specific intent to misappropriate and pro-
scribes an attempt and conspiracy to misappropriate trade secrets. Id § 1832(a)(4)-(5). An-
other section of the EEA addresses trade secret theft and industrial espionage by foreign gov-
ernments and their agents. Id § 1831. The offense of "economic espionage" under § 1831
requires the government also prove the defendant knew the offense would benefit or was in-
tended to benefit a foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent, as defined in
the Act. Id. § 1831(a).
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A person convicted of violating the EEA may be imprisoned for
up to ten years and fined.9 6 A corporation or other organization may
be fined up to $5,000,000.97 An additional penalty is forfeiture of
property used to commit the offense or derived as a result of the of-
fense. 98
V. ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS
That which is legal or profitable may not always be the ethical
choice. Ethics determine what we ought to do.99 "In its most general
sense ethics is a systematic attempt to make sense of our individual
and social moral experience, in such a way as to determine the rules
that ought to govern human conduct, the values worth pursuing, and
the character traits deserving development in life."'' There exists an
array of approaches to guide ethical decision-making. Some theories
are deontological and focus on the decision or action itself, while
other theories are teleological and are primarily concerned with the
outcome or consequence.' 0' Deontology defines a pre-established set
of overriding standards by which ethical behavior can be measured."
When an ethical dilemma arises, a person can apply these standards to
define an ethical course of action, regardless of whether a good out-
come results from the action. 03 A person decides what to do in a
situation by asking if a particular action is right or wrong, because the
act itself is more important than its consequence.'4 By contrast, when
deciding whether an action is ethical, teleological theories focus on
the result or consequence of the action, rather than on the nature of the
action itself or any set of preexisting moral duties. 05 Whether an ac-
tion is morally right or wrong depends on its overall consequences. '06
96. Id. § 1832(a).
97. Id. § 1832(b).
98. Id. § 1834(a).
99. See RICHARD T. DE GEORGE, BUSINESS ETHICS 19 (5th ed. 1999).
100. Id. at 20 (emphasis omitted).
101. Id. at 52.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.; WILuIAM H. SHAw, BUSINESS ETHICS 43 (5th ed. 2005).
105. DE GEORGE, supra note 99, at 52.
106. Id.; SHAw, supra note 104, at 43.
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Business ethics is concerned with how business managers ought
to behave."°7 "Ethical theories attempt to systematize ordinary moral
judgments, and to establish and defend basic moral principles."' 0 8
This section examines four predominant ethical theories that can be
used to guide business managers in making ethical decisions: (1) for-
malism; (2) rights theory; (3) utilitarianism; and (4) justice theory.
The strengths and weaknesses of each ethical theory are also pre-
sented. The discussion then turns to the ethical responsibility of busi-
ness with a focus on applying these ethical frameworks to profit
maximization, with stakeholder analysis as contrasting approaches to
decision-making.
A. Formalism
Formalism is a strict deontological approach to ethical decision-
making most often associated with Immanuel Kant, a moral philoso-
pher who believed certain ethical norms apply universally, irrespec-
tive of their consequences. 1°9 Kant viewed people as moral actors who
could make ethical decisions by applying a universal principle that he
referred to as the "categorical imperative.""' For Kant, an act is either
right or wrong in itself; even a wrong act that leads to a good result is
unjustifiable."' One formulation of the categorical imperative is we
should act or judge an action by applying it universally-whether a
rule or decision is one a rational person would want applied univer-
sally to all people in every situation."' This principle sets out an ethi-
cal norm of universal reciprocity that places each person in the posi-
107. See DE GEORGE, supra note 99, at 24.
108. Id. at 51.
109. See SHAW, supra note 104, at 53.
110. IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 38-39 (Lewis
White Beck trans., 2d ed. rev. 1990); see also NORMAN E. BOWIE, BUSINESS ETHICS: A
KANTIAN PERSPECTIVE 24 (1999).
111. See KANT, supra note 110, at 38-39; see also SHAW, supra note 104, at 53.
112. KANT, supra note 110, at 38-39. This principle can be thought of as a formulation
of the Golden Rule as enunciated in Judeo-Christian religious texts. See DE GEORGE, supra
note 99, at 52; SHAw, supra note 104, at 56; Luke 6:31 (King James) ("And as ye would that
men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise."); Babylonian Talmud: Shabbath 31a
("What is hateful to you, do not to your neighbor .... "). Examples of universal rules are: It
is always wrong to steal from others and Never tell a lie. Kant also restated the categorical
imperative to explain that we should always treat others as an end and never as a means to an
end. KANT, supra note 110, at 46-47.
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tion of owing an obligation to all others."3 As a strict deontologist,
Kant believed a person renders an ethical decision based on what is
right, regardless of the consequences or results of the act." 4 Thus, an
ethical rule is categorical because it guides us independent of the re-
sult sought.115 Moreover, Kant believed it is wrong to objectify indi-
viduals-to treat others merely as a means to an end. 116 He argued
that one person cannot use another simply to satisfy his or her own in-
terests.
17
Suppose a business desires to end its performance of a contract
because the deal has been much less profitable than originally antici-
pated. To justify this action, the business owner applies the following
ethical rule: I am entitled to cancel a contract that proves to be less
profitable to me than I expected. According to Kant, the business
owner would not select this rule as a universal norm because he would
not want this rule applied to him by another contracting party. 118
Moreover, such a rule would ultimately undermine all contracts 19 and
lead to economic instability. Nor would it be right for the business
owner to except his own contracts from being rescinded by others.
Kantian formalism holds that the principle governing the action must
be universalized, and to make an exception for yourself is immoral. 120
As such, this rule does not satisfy the categorical imperative, and it is
wrong to repudiate a contract merely because it turns out to be less
profitable than expected. 121
The main criticism of Kantian formalism is its premise that moral
rules are absolute. 122 As such, they narrowly emphasize universal du-
113. See KANT, supra note 110, at 39.
114. See id.; see also SHAW, supra note 104, at 53.
115. See KANT, supra note 110, at 38-39.
116. Id. at46-47.
117. Id.; see also ETHICAL THEORY AND BusiNEss, supra note 21, at 22-23; SHAW, su-
pra note 104, at 56-57.
118. See KANT, supra note 110, at 39.
119. See 407 E. 61st St. Garage, Inc. v. Savoy Fifth Ave. Corp., 244 N.E.2d 37, 42
(N.Y. 1968).
120. See KANT, supra note 110, at 39; see also SHAw, supra note 104, at 56.
121. This is also a well-established rule of contract law. See 407 E. 61st St. Garage,
244 N.E.2d at 42 ("[A] party [is not permitted] to abrogate a contract, unilaterally, merely
upon a showing that it would be financially disadvantageous to perform it; were the rules oth-
erwise, they would place in jeopardy all commercial contracts."); Hancock Paper Co. v.
Champion Int'l Corp., 424 F. Supp. 285, 290 (E.D. Pa. 1976) ("The fact that [a party does]
not profit from its contract.., does not render its performance impossible.").
122. ETHIcAL THEORY AND BUSINESS, supra note 21, at 25-26; SHAW, supra note 104, at
[Vol. 42230
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ties above particular obligations that may arise only in specific roles
or relationships.123 Such formulaic reasoning may lead to extreme or
unfair results. 2 n To illustrate, consider the universal rule directing:
Never cause harm to another person. Because the rule is absolute, we
could never justify using physical force that results in injury to an at-
tacker, even in self-defense.2 5 Another important limitation of strict
deontology is it provides no guidance when a person is confronted by
two conflicting rules and does not know which to follow; formalism
does not explain how to determine which rule trumps the other to re-
solve the dilemma. 126
B. Rights Theory
Rights theory represents another formulation of deontology. 127
According to this theory, a key factor in determining whether a deci-
sion is ethical is how the decision affects the rights of others. 128 Rights
are justified claims for or against something; they may be either posi-
tive or negative.129 Negative rights obligate people to leave the rights-
holder alone when he or she undertakes certain activities; positive
rights obligate people to do something for the rights-holder. 130 When
there is disagreement over the relative strength or importance of com-
peting rights, the more fundamental right under the circumstances
prevails.' Rights theory dictates that before a business acts, it must
consider carefully how its decision will impact the rights of others. 3 2
58.
123. ETmCAL THEORY AND BUSINESS, supra note 21, at 26.
124. See SHAW, supra note 104, at 58 (discussing when exceptions to a rule may be de-
sirable).
125. Cf id (discussing that it may be permissible to steal rather than starve).
126. DE GEORGE, supra note 99, at 92.
127. See DE GEORGE, supra note 99, at 98-99. For discussions on rights theory, see
generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); ROBERT NOzICK, ANARCHY,
STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974); JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS (1990); J. L.
Mackie, Can There Be a Right-Based Moral Theory?, in 3 MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY:
STUDIES IN ETHICAL THEORY 350 (1978).
128. See JOSEPH R. DESJARDINS & JOHN J. MCCALL, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN
BUSINESS ETHICS 47-55 (4th ed. 2000); see also SHAW, supra note 104, at 62-63.
129. DE GEORGE, supra note 99, at 98-99.
130. Id. at 99; see also ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS, supra note 21, at 29-30; SHAW,
supra note 104, at 63.
131. See DE GEORGE, supra note 99, at 99-100; SHAw, supra note 104, at 63.
132. SHAW, supra note 104, at 64.
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As such, rights function as a constraint on what a business may do to
serve its own ends. 133
Although rights theory is intended to emphasize rights rather than
duties, each right implies a corresponding duty on the part of others. 134
To apply rights theory, the decision-maker must determine which fun-
damental rights are involved and how they should be ranked in impor-
tance. 35 It is often difficult to agree which rights are fundamental. 1
36
Another limitation of rights theory is its lack of guidance for pri-
oritizing rights and correlative duties. 137  For example, is an em-
ployee's right to privacy in the contents of his email or briefcase more
fundamental than the employer's right to protect confidential proprie-
tary information? In addition, rights theory emphasizes the costs and
overall consequences of enforcing one right over another. 138 For in-
stance, if an employee has a right to a job, how motivated will she be
to put forth her best efforts to maintain or improve the quality of her
work?
C. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism is the most well-known teleological or consequen-
tialist theory of ethical justification. 139 Under utilitarian theory, the
morality of an act is judged by the good or bad produced by its conse-
quences in terms of social benefit or utility."4° A utilitarian assumes
133. Id.
134. See DE GEORGE, supra note 99, at 99; ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS, supra note
21, at 29.
135. See DE GEORGE, supra note 99, at 98; ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS, supra note
21, at 30-31.
136. See ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS, supra note 21, at 30-3 1; SHAW, supra note
104, at 65.
137. See ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS, supra note 21, at 30-3 1.
138. See DE GEORGE, supra note 99, at 100.
139. Id. at 52. John Stuart Mill is the best known proponent of utilitarianism. See id. at
57 n.1; JOHN STUART MILL, THE BASIC WRITINGS OF JOHN STUART MILL: ON LIBERTY, THE
SUBJECTION OF WOMEN AND UTILITARIANISM (Modem Library 2002) (1859).
140. DE GEORGE, supra note 99, at 57. There are two major forms of utilitarianism: act
utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism. Id. at 61-65; ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS, supra
note 21, at 20-21; SHAW, supra note 104, at 48. Act utilitarianism assesses each action ac-
cording to whether it maximizes benefits over detriments. DE GEORGE, supra note 99, at 61;
ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS, supra note 21, at 20; SHAW, supra note 104, at 48. Rule
utilitarianism holds that certain general rules must be set out and followed even though fol-
lowing these rules may result in less overall utility than if they were not followed. DE
GEORGE, supra note 99, at 62; ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS, supra note 21, at 20; SHAw,
supra note 104, at 48.
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material things generate utility or satisfaction, and an efficient alloca-
tion of resources contributes to overall material abundance. 1 ' The
only concern is whether one action from among the available alterna-
tive actions produces maximum social utility.14 2 An action is morally
proper when it produces "the greatest amount of good for the greatest
number of people affected by the action."' 4 3 Much like a cost-benefit
analysis, the ends justify the means when the common good is maxi-
mized.' This simplicity is the main strength of utilitarianism as an
ethical construct: our decision is ethical when we do what is best for
society as a whole.'45
A major criticism of utilitarian theory is it subordinates the inter-
ests of the individual and minority to the attainment of greatest overall
gain. "4 In addition, utilitarianism does not address the likelihood that
each increment of profit or material value yields decreasing marginal
utility to its recipient. 4 7 Often, a utilitarian analysis must also attempt
to measure things that are not easily measurable.'48 For instance, how
do we measure a unit of happiness or satisfaction? 49 Likewise, utili-
tarianism is of limited value in decision-making when the outcome is
not clear, and it does not provide a standard for predicting the success
or failure of particular actions or for quantifying utility generated. 150
The well-being of an individual can be sacrificed for an action that
brings society greater satisfaction,' 5' leading to unfair distributions of
benefits or unjust results for those not benefited.'52
141. See DE GEORGE, supra note 99, at 57; ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS, supra note
21, at 19.
142. DE GEORGE, supra note 99, at 57.
143. Id.; see also ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS, supra note 21, at 18; SHAW, supra
note 104, at 47.
144. DE GEORGE, supra note 99, at 57; see ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS, supra note
21, at 18.
145. See ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS, supra note 21, at 18; SHAW, supra note 104,
at 49.
146. ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS, supra note 21, at 21.
147. See id. at 21-22.
148. Id. at 21; SHAW, supra note 104, at 50.
149. ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS, supra note 21, at 21; SHAW, supra note 104, at
50.
150. See ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS, supra note 21, at 21-22.
151. Id. at 21. Because rights theory is deontological, a rights theorist would argue that
when a claim based on the assertion of a right conflicts with a claim based on a consequence
or utility, the claim based on assertion of a right must always trump the claim based on a con-
sequence. See DE GEORGE, supra note 99, at 80.
152. See SHAW, supra note 104, at 48 (discussing researchers who intentionally infected
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D. Justice Theory
Justice theory is based on the idea of fairness. 153  It is another
teleological approach to ethical decision-making, articulated by phi-
losopher John Rawls. 5 4 This theory states that ethical decisions are
guided by fairness and lead to an equitable distribution of society's re-
sources.'55 Distributive justice expresses sensitivity as to how to share
the benefits and allocate the burdens of society in making decisions. 15 6
Rawls suggests considering how to distribute benefits and burdens as
if in the "original position"-in a natural state-and under a "veil of
ignorance," to prevent knowing a particular social status.'57 He rec-
ommends considering the rules to impose on society without regard to
whether a person would be rich or poor.
Rawls also posits building a fair system in which income and
benefits would be distributed unequally only when it would benefit all
or the least advantaged.5 8 This result follows since decision-makers
are behind the veil of ignorance and would not know whether they
would be advantaged or disadvantaged until the veil was lifted.'59 As
such, decision-makers would be less likely to act solely out of self-
interest,"6 which is the main strength of Rawls' theory.
According to justice theory, while decisions are to be guided by
fairness and impartiality, the main focus is on the outcome of the deci-
sion.161 Ethical justice is measured by the likelihood that a decision
mentally retarded children with viral hepatitis to expand understanding of the disease, and
possibly excusing the practice as producing the "most good for the whole society").
153. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 67 PHIL. REv. 164, 164 (1958); see also DE
GEORGE, supra note 99, at 101.
154. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); Rawls, supra note 153. Aristotle
also enunciated the theory of justice as fairness. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
1130b-1131a (Roger Crisp trans., 2000). Aristotle argued that society should aim to equitably
distribute benefits and opportunities, with the goal of alleviating inequalities. See id. This
does not mean that every member of society is entitled to an equal distribution; rather, they
are entitled to a distribution based on their legitimate needs. See id
155. See Rawls, supra note 153, at 164-65; see also SHAw, supra note 104, at 101-03.
156. See RAWLS, supra note 154, at 7; see also DE GEORGE, supra note 99, at 101;
SHAW, supra note 104, at 103-04.
157. RAWLS, supra note 154, at 118-68; see also SHAW, supra note 104, at 96-98.
158. See RAWLS, supra note 154, at 17-22, 130-36; see also SHAW, supra note 104, at
98.
159. See RAWLS, supra note 154, at 136-42; see also SHAw, supra note 104, at 98.
160. RAWLS, supra note 154, at 137; see also SHAw, supra note 104, at 98.
161. RAWLS, supra note 154, at 10-11; see also ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS, supra
note 21, at 630-31.
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would be fair to all members of society, particularly the least advan-
taged. 62 In other words, Rawls suggests resolving ethical dilemmas
without considering the personal position held in relation to the out-
come and whether a person would incur a benefit or suffer a detriment
as a result of the ultimate decision.163
Justice theory postulates a person would make the most socially
just and fair decision in this situation. 164 For instance, consider a cor-
poration facing the decision of whether to relocate a factory from a
prosperous and relatively affluent region to an economically distressed
part of the country. In deciding a course of action that most fairly al-
locates social benefits and burdens, the corporation may decide to re-
locate the factory because the residents in the distressed region have
fewer employment opportunities and a lower standard of living.
Justice theory shares some of the criticisms often applied to rights
theory. It treats equality and fairness as absolutes, without consider-
ing the costs involved in achieving equality or a fair distribution. For
businesses, such costs may be significant because they may include
fewer incentives for innovation, reduced profits, or lower productivity.
Moreover, justice theory assumes it is possible to accurately measure
wealth or advantage as a basis for allocating social benefits. In many
instances, however, this is unrealistic.
E. Decision-Making and the Ethical Responsibility of Business: Profit
Maximization vs. Stakeholder Analysis
The most obvious context for analyzing ethical dilemmas in the
business environment is managerial decision-making. Profit maximi-
zation is the traditional goal guiding business decision-making, mak-
ing a firm's primary responsibility to maximize profits and obey the
law.165 The main thrust of this position is economic and stresses the
162. See RAWLS, supra note 154, at 11; see also ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS, supra
note 21, at 631-32.
163. RAWLS, supra note 154, at 118-68; see also ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS, supra
note 21, at 633.
164. RAWTS, supra note 154, at 11; see also ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS, supra note
21, at 633.
165. See ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS, supra note 21, at 45. Profit maximization
isbased on the laissez-faire theory of capitalism widely espoused by Adam Smith in the eight-
eenth century. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (C.J. Bullock ed., 1909) (1776).
Profit maximization also justified the decision in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668
(Mich. 1919), where shareholders of Ford sued when the board of directors reduced the price
20061 235
27
Saunders: The Law and Ethics of Trade Secrets: A Case Study
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2005
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
interests of the firm's owners or shareholders. 66 Assuming it does so
within the bounds of the law, a firm that maximizes long term profits
in a competitive market also increases productivity and allocative effi-
ciency. 161 Thus, the inquiry is whether an otherwise lawful action will
lead to profit maximization. 168 By maximizing profits, firms ensure
that scarce economic resources are allocated to the uses society values
most highly, thereby maximizing overall economic welfare. 169  If an
action does not maximize profits, then the rational firm should not un-
dertake the action. 70 If an action is illegal, then the threat of punish-
ment should deter a firm from engaging in such conduct.' 7'
Advocates of profit maximization often look to utilitarianism as a
source of ethical justification.'72 Because profit maximization under
competitive conditions results in the most efficient allocation and use
of resources, those actions that maximize profits will be morally sup-
portable. 7 3  In addition, utilitarianism does not inevitably support
profit maximization because profit maximization can also involve util-
ity costs that may outweigh gains in utility resulting from greater effi-
ciency. 174
Rights theory could also be used to support profit maximization,
because activities, such as maximizing profits, contribute to realizing
certain positive economic rights and should be protected. 75 However,
of their cars and refused to declare a special dividend. Id. at 670-71. The court stated, "[a]
business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders."
Id. at 684; see also Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d
1264, 1277 (6th Cir. 1980) (refusing to prohibit a steel manufacturer from closing an unprof-
itable and obsolescent plant).
166. ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS, supra note 21, at 45.
167. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Prof-
its, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970 (Magazine). Allocative efficiency is the optimal state that re-
sults when consumer surplus is maximized; it occurs when no further production and ex-
changes of goods would further improve the economic situation. WILLIAM G. SHEPHERD, THE
EcONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: ANALYSIS, MARKETS, POLICIES 35 (4th ed. 1997).
168. See Friedman, supra note 167.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See DE GEORGE, supra note 99, at 196; John Hasnas, Two Normative Theories of
Business Ethics: A Critique, in ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS, supra note 21, at 65, 67.
172. Hasnas, supra note 171, at 67: see also DE GEORGE, supra note 99, at 57.
173. Hasnas, supra note 171, at 67; see also DE GEORGE, supra note 99, at 57.
174. See Hasnas, supra note 171, at 67; see also DE GEORGE, supra note 99, at 57-58.
175. See DE GEORGE, supra note 99, at 99 (discussing positive and negative rights).
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other rights-based claims may overcome profit maximization when the
two rights conflict. 17
6
Those who reject profit maximization as the main goal for busi-
ness typically point out that maximizing profits usually benefits only
one set of the firm's constituents: its owners or shareholders. 177 This
argument submits that profit maximization may result in harm to em-
ployees, consumers, communities, the environment, and society as a
whole.178 For instance, a U.S. corporation decides to outsource some
of its operations to China in order to cut labor costs. This decision
may in fact increase corporate profits and overall economic welfare,
but the consequences to former employees and the surrounding com-
munity may be dire. 179 As such, some argue that rather than acting
only to maximize profits for owners, a business should balance owner
or shareholder interests against the interests of other constituencies. 8 0
According to this approach, businesses have different constituencies,
or stakeholders, who often have conflicting goals.181 A business is re-
sponsible to society at large and, more directly, owes fiduciary re-
sponsibilities to its stakeholders. 182 In making ethical and responsible
176. See ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS, supra note 21, at 30-31.
177. See Hasnas, supra note 171, at 69-70.
178. See ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS, supra note 21, at 47.
179. On the other hand, not outsourcing operations to China may result in the need for
the corporation to raise prices or accept lower profits and pay lower dividends. In the long
run, this may steer investors away and result in less production and lower overall social wel-
fare. Thus, supporters of profit maximization might argue that business managers should not
concern themselves with social responsibility, either because market forces will lead them to
social responsibility if it is economically efficient, or because government regulation will step
in if there is sufficient public dissatisfaction. See Friedman, supra note 167.
180. R. Edward Freeman, Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation, in ETHICAL
ISSUES IN BUSINESS: A PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH 247-48 (Thomas Donaldson & Patricia H.
Werhane eds., 6th ed. 1999); see also David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law:
Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 12 (Lawrence E.
Mitchell ed., 1995) ("[M]anagement should pursue profit-seeking strategies that harmonize
shareholder and nonshareholder interests where possible."); Joseph S. Spoerl, The Social Re-
sponsibility of Business, 42 Am. J. JuRis. 277, 297 (1997) ("The duty of the business
owner... is to create products that satisfy genuine human needs, and to do so as efficiently as
possible while treating customers, suppliers, workers, and neighbors fairly.").
181. See Millon, supra note 180, at 12.
182. Freeman, supra note 180, at 247; Millon, supra note 180, at 12; see Spoerl, supra
note 180, at 297. In resolving a shareholder suit, for example, the court in A. P. Smith Manu-
facturing Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953), recognized that the board of directors could
properly consider the public welfare of society in deciding to make a charitable contribution
on behalf of the corporation to Princeton University. Id. at 590.
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decisions, a firm should balance the interests of its various stake-
holders and be managed for the benefit of all of its stakeholders. 183
Although utilitarian theory might justify the stakeholder approach
to decision-making, if recognizing each stakeholder's interest would
yield more net utility than not, advocates of stakeholder analysis often
look to deontology as a standard of ethical justification. 14 Underlying
Kant's categorical imperative is a concern for the interests of others
that directs a firm to act as it would want all other firms to act. 185
Moreover, Kantian formalism stresses the dignity of the person, so
that considering and respecting the interests of stakeholders is conso-
nant with respecting their humanity. 186
Rights theory can also justify a decision arrived at through stake-
holder analysis. If we assume each of the firm's stakeholders has
positive economic rights, the implication is that the firm also has cer-
tain duties to those stakeholders. 187 In applying stakeholder analysis,
the firm must first determine the stakeholders who will be affected by
the decision and then assess the impact of the decision on them. The
firm must balance the interests of each to make ethical decisions that
do not unfairly benefit or harm one group over another.188
Obviously, the rights of relevant stakeholders often conflict. 18 9
When the firm does not maximize profits, investors and owners re-
ceive lower returns, employees may be paid lower wages, and con-
sumers may pay higher prices or have fewer choices. The consumers'
interest in lower prices may conflict with employees' interest in higher
wages or with the community's interest in keeping the firm's plant in
operation, even though relocating it would mean more efficient pro-
duction and lower wages. Further, stakeholder analysis does not an-
swer the ultimate questions of when to give priority to one group of
stakeholders over another and why the firm's immediate constituen-
183. See ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS, supra note 21, at 48.
184. See id. at 59-63, 67 (discussing the deontologies of Kant and Rawls).
185. See KANT, supra note 110, at 38-39.
186. See id. at 47.
187. See DE GEORGE, supra note 99, at 99.
188. See SHAW, supra note 104, at 64. Interests include (1) owners and investors want-
ing to maximize profits, (2) members of the community where the business is located wanting
to preserve jobs, (3) employees expecting job security and higher wages, (4) government
regulators demanding compliance with applicable laws and regulations, and (5) consumers
seeking product quality and lower prices. See Freeman, supra note 180, at 250-252 (describ-
ing the rights of the stakeholders).
189. See Freeman, supra note 180, at 250.
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cies should be favored over society as a whole. Finally, opponents of
stakeholder theory often argue that market forces, public opinion, and
the law are sufficient to constrain unethical business practices. 9 0 As
such, they argue that business managers should focus their efforts on
obeying the law and maximizing profits.' 9' Whether profit maximiza-
tion or stakeholder analysis should be the preferred basis for business
decision-making remains an ongoing debate in business ethics. 192
VI. TEACHING NOTES
A. Teaching Objectives
This case study is intended to spark an appreciation for the legal
and ethical issues that arise in businesses owning trade secrets. The
main objectives for teaching the case are to:
1. Recognize the importance of trade secrets in business.
2. Acquire an understanding of trade secret law.
3. Identify legal and ethical issues involving the use of trade
secrets.
4. Apply the legal principles of trade secret law to a fact
situation and reach a conclusion.
5. Acquire an understanding of ethical frameworks used in
business decision-making.
6. Analyze the ethical aspects of trade secret misappropria-
tion.
7. Design practical strategies for protecting trade secrets.
The ultimate pedagogical goal of this case study is to encourage
expanding the ability to analyze the legal and ethical issues into prac-
tical recommendations for businesses that want to develop and safe-
guard their trade secrets.
190. See Hasnas, supra note 171, at 69-70.
191. See id. at 70.
192. See, e.g., John R. Boatright, Fiduciary Duties and the Shareholder-Management
Relation: Or, What's So Special About Shareholders?, 4 Bus. ETMIcs Q. 393 (1994); John
Hasnas, The Normative Theories of Business Ethics: A Guide for the Perplexed, 8 Bus.
ETHIcs Q. 19 (1998).
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B. Potential Uses of the Case
A number of theorists have proposed educational models that rec-
ognize the importance of confronting ethical dilemmas in the process
of moral development.'93 These and other models support the use of
legal case studies as a means of promoting the development of ethical
reasoning skills." This case study can be used as part of a variety of
courses devoted to intellectual property law or business law.
C. Discussion
From a public interest standpoint, protecting trade secrets is im-
portant to encourage innovation, creativity, and technological devel-
opment by assuring the inventor or creator that he or she will be given
the first chance to harvest the benefits of the investment. 95 Using
trade secret law to protect information represents a choice not to pub-
licly disclose the information and to safeguard its value by preventing
access to competitors. 196 In doing so, trade secret law protects an eco-
nomic investment against free riders by discouraging those who might
otherwise attempt to gain unauthorized access to the information
through improper means. 197 Moreover, trade secret law encourages
the development and exploitation of those inventions that might not be
protected under the patent laws, but which still have an important role
to play in technological and scientific advancement.198
193. E.g., BENJAMIN S. BLOOM ET AL., HANDBOOK ON FORMATIVE AND SUMMATIVE
EVALUATION OF STUDENT LEARNING 39-40 (1971) (describing Bloom's taxonomy of educa-
tional objectives); LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: THE
NATURE AND VALIDITY OF MORAL STAGES (1984); WILLIAM G. PERRY, JR., INTELLECTUAL
AND ETHICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE COLLEGE YEARS (1970).
194. See Kurt M. Saunders & Linda Levine, Learning to Think Like a Lawyer, 29
U.S.F. L. REV. 121, 132-44 (1994) (discussing use of the Bloom, Perry, and Kohlberg models
to study the process of learning legal and ethical reasoning).
195. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. Some have argued trade secret law
is now more concerned with protecting businesses and investors than with benefiting society.
See Michael P. Simpson, Note, The Future of Innovation: Trade Secrets, Property Rights, and
Protectionism-An Age-Old Tale, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1149-55 (2005).
196. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985).
197. See Eden Hannon & Co. v. Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co., 914 F.2d 556, 561
(4th Cir. 1990).
198. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 17, at 359.
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1. Legal Analysis of the Case
Applying the UTSA, the analysis of this case involves two steps:
does Citadel have any protectable trade secrets, and, if so, were any of
the trade secrets misappropriated? A protectable trade secret is (1) in-
formation, (2) which derives independent economic value, (3) from
not being generally known or readily ascertainable through proper
means by those who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or
use, and (4) is the subject of reasonable efforts under the circum-
stances to maintain its secrecy. 199 Based on the facts provided, Citadel
has a protectable trade secret in all valuable information not known or
readily discoverable by Northwell, and Citadel maintained the infor-
mation as a secret by reasonable means.
The design protocols that Citadel engineers used, but were not
known or detectable by consumers and competitors, would likely be
protectable. Trade secrets include know-how, research results, and so-
called negative information or "blind alleys. ' 200 This "includes infor-
mation that has commercial value from a negative viewpoint, for ex-
ample the results of lengthy and expensive research which proves that
a certain process will not work could be of great value to a competi-
tor.- 20
1
It is crucial to determine whether Citadel used reasonable efforts
to maintain secrecy in the disclosure and use of information by its em-
ployees that would give rise to an inference that further disclosure was
not permitted.0 2 If Citadel used reasonable efforts, it may have a
199. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4).
200. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
201. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 1 cmt.
202. Cf. Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion., Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 901 (Minn.
1983) ("[T]he employer cannot complain of the employee's use of information if the em-
ployer has never treated the information as secret."). In Spottiswoode v. Levine, 730 A.2d 166
(Me. 1999), the court identified and considered the following factors in addressing this issue:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside the plaintiff's busi-
ness; (2) the extent to which employees and others involved in the plaintiffs
business know the information; (3) the nature and extent of measures the
plaintiff took to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the existence or ab-
sence of an express agreement restricting disclosure; and (5) the circum-
stances under which the information was disclosed to any employee, to the
extent that the circumstances give rise to a reasonable inference that further
disclosure without the plaintiffs consent is prohibited.
Id. at 175 n.7; accord Dicks v. Jensen, 768 A.2d 1279 (Vt. 2001). Other "factors to determine
the reasonableness of efforts to maintain the information's secrecy, includ[e] whether parties
had a written agreement not to compete, whether knowledge was confined to any restricted
2006]
33
Saunders: The Law and Ethics of Trade Secrets: A Case Study
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2005
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
valid claim. However, Citadel is unlikely to have any protectable in-
terest in Hart's aptitude, skill, dexterity, manual and mental ability,
and such other subjective knowledge he obtained in the course of his
employment because an employee's aptitude, skill, experience, and
general knowledge are not information for purposes of trade secret
law.2
03
If Citadel subsequently discovers Northwell applied Citadel's
know-how and other confidential proprietary information contained in
Hart's notes in developing Northwell's new system, Citadel will need
to prove Northwell obtained the information through improper
means. 2° Here, this might include inducing Hart to breach his fiduci-
ary duty of confidentiality to Citadel.20 5 Likewise, Hart may face li-
ability for disclosing such information, knowing he was under an ob-
ligation to keep it secret. 2°
Given these facts, it is unlikely Northwell could assert reverse en-
gineering or independent discovery as a defense.0 7 However, North-
well could argue Citadel did not use reasonable means to maintain se-
crecy because it did not require Hart to sign a confidentiality
agreement or return his notes before departing. 208 This argument will
not likely be successful because employees owe a fiduciary duty of
loyalty to the employer even in the absence of such an agreement. 2°9
Whether Citadel should have implemented other means of securing its
proprietary information and know-how is also a relevant considera-
tion. The facts also give rise to possible prosecution under the EEA.21 °
Any criminal action against Northwell will hinge on proof that
group of employees, and the extent of measures to guard access to the information." Id. at
1284 (citations omitted).
203. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
204. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1).
205. See id. § l(2)(ii)(B)(l).
206. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
209. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958) ("[An agent is subject to a duty
to his principal to act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters connected with his
agency."); see also Churchill Commc'ns Corp. v. Demyanovich, 668 F. Supp. 207, 211
(S.D.N.Y. 1987); Rubner v. Gursky, 21 N.Y.S.2d 558, 561 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940).
210. See Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2000); supra
notes 86-98 and accompanying text.
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Northwell had specific intent to convert Citadel's trade secrets in hir-
ing Hart and accepting his research notes.2
2. Ethical Analysis of the Case
When a business decides to misappropriate another's intellectual
property, decision-makers may be unaware of the consequences or
may attempt to justify their decision using profit maximization or
stakeholder analysis as supported by traditional ethical theories. For
instance, a business may base a decision to misappropriate on the
grounds of profit maximization; that misappropriation, even if de-
tected, will result in greater efficiency, higher profits and sales, or
lower costs. 212 Here, Northwell gained access to valuable information
that likely sped up its development of a rival product, allowing it to
avoid at least some research and development costs it would have oth-
erwise incurred. Another point worth considering, however, is the
long-term effect on profits if the misappropriation leads to litigation
and negative publicity.
By contrast, stakeholder analysis would begin by identifying all of
the stakeholders who may be affected by the decisions and actions at
issue. Here, the stakeholders include shareholders of the corporation,
Northwell employees, the public, the customers, and perhaps the soft-
ware industry. What responsibility does Northwell owe to each? Will
the investing public perceive Northwell's and Hart's actions in a nega-
tive light? If so, will such an image influence how others in the sup-
ply chain deal with Northwell?
Turning to application of the ethical theories, a Kantian analysis
would condemn misappropriation as a violation of the universal rule
against stealing what belongs to another.2 3 In applying Kant's cate-
gorical imperative, Northwell must consider whether it wants to do
business in a market where competitors could so easily and cheaply
appropriate the results of their investment in research and develop-
ment. Rights theory would examine the rights of the various parties
involved in this case.214 Citadel has a property right in the software
due to its investment in the product's development. What rights do
211. See 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a).
212. See supra notes 165-170 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 110-121 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 128-137 and accompanying text.
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Hart and Northwell have? Furthermore, do consumers have a right to
benefit from the greater efficiency achieved in managing databases
and the lower prices that may result from increased competition by
other software developers seeking to create even better tools? Hart
may argue he has a right to benefit from changing employers, and im-
posing liability on him will diminish his and other employees' ability
to increase their incomes, take advantage of better job opportunities,
and enhance their experience and bargaining positions. Likewise, the
connections between employee mobility, competition, and increased
economic growth may implicate the public interest as well.
215
Alternatively, a business might rely on utilitarian analysis to con-
clude that infringement in the name of providing a competitive substi-
tute will ultimately result in greater social utility and consumer satis-
faction.216 A utilitarian would consider whether more good is ever
produced by hiring away employees from competitors with the intent
of learning their trade secrets by balancing the costs against the possi-
ble benefits.217 In applying utilitarian theory to this case, we must first
identify who is most affected by the decision, and then weigh the
benefits and detriments to those most involved. Northwell will likely
increase its profits from Hart's development of the software, while
consumers of Northwell's products will benefit from savings gained
from more efficient database management tools. Citadel may lose
first-mover advantage in the market, but it is likely to develop compet-
ing software that will yield additional profits, though less than it may
have earned had it been the first to market such a product.
However, if there is no liability for misappropriation of a busi-
ness's trade secret, then there will be no incentive in the future to en-
gage in inventive activities because it would be cheaper to wait for
others to develop an innovation and then appropriate it from them.218
In the long run, however, this free riding will likely lead to an overall
decline in innovation and technological development because there
215. Cf LANDES & POSNER, supra note 17, at 365-66 (suggesting that the performance
of Silicon Valley firms and the economic growth in the surrounding area greatly surpassed
that of the firms along Route 128 in Massachusetts because employee mobility and new busi-
ness start-ups were more dynamic, due to the unenforceability of noncompetition agreements
in California).
216. See supra notes 143-145 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 140-145 and accompanying text.
218. See Eden Hannon & Co. v. Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co., 914 F.2d 556, 561
(4th Cir. 1990).
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will be no reward for innovation. 9 Similarly, justice theory would
question the overall fairness of the result achieved by Hart's and
Northwell's actions. 2  It is unlikely that if Hart was in the original
position and under the veil of ignorance, not knowing whether he
might be an employee or a trade secret owner, he would choose a rule
that allowed employees to freely disclose or sell an employer's trade
secrets. 2
3. Managerial Implications
There are a number of time-tested strategies Citadel, or any other
business for that matter, can do to prevent theft or disclosure of its
trade secrets. The first step to protecting trade secrets is identifying
them. 2 2 A business's portfolio of trade secrets should be regularly
audited as some information will become obsolete and not commer-
cially viable over time, while new proprietary information will be
generated and must therefore be protected.223 Once a business has
used due diligence to identify all proprietary information that may
qualify as trade secrets, then the business should adopt, implement,
and periodically reassess a set of affirmative practices to safeguard
those trade secrets.224 Of course, the type of measures applied to
maintain secrecy will depend on the nature of the information, the
type of business involved, and other relative circumstances.225 Meas-
ures that would be considered reasonable for a large corporation may
not be reasonable for a small business due to the expense of such
measures.
A comprehensive and proactive trade secret protection strategy in
this case might include the following measures: labeling as SECRET,
PROPRIETARY, or CONFIDENTIAL all documents containing the
information; limiting distribution and physical access through locks,
access codes, computer passwords, firewalls, or security guards; dis-
seminating detailed policies to all who have access to the information
219. See id.
220. See supra notes 153-158 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 158-164 and accompanying text.
222. Fraumann & Koletar, supra note 8, at 63.
223. See Michael A. Epstein & Stuart D. Levi, Protecting Trade Secret Information: A
Plan for Proactive Strategy, 43 Bus. LAW. 887, 899 (1988).
224. See Fraumann & Koletar, supra note 8, at 63-64.
225. See McJoHN, supra note 32, at 306-09.
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to prevent inadvertent disclosure or distribution; limiting the number
of and tracking all copies of relevant documents, including sign out
and sign in procedures; encrypting the information; specifically-
drafted licensing agreements for external users or licensees of the
trade secret; and surveillance of employees or visitors to the business
site.226 If the trade secret must be disclosed to employees, customers,
suppliers, joint venture partners, or other licensees, then the trade se-
cret owner should do so on a need to know basis and conduct briefings
for new employees and exit interviews for departing employees.227
The employer should take steps to inform the user of the information's
proprietary nature.
Using confidentiality and noncompetition agreements should be
carefully considered. Many employees and managers, as a condition
of employment, sign agreements acknowledging the employment cre-
ates a relationship of confidence and trust with respect to specified in-
formation. 228 By entering into a noncompetition agreement, an em-
ployee agrees not to work for any business that is a competitor of the
employer for a specified period of time after the end of his employ-
ment. 229 These agreements could be used with independent contrac-
tors, consultants, or other partners of the trade secret owner because
individuals may someday become a competitor of the trade secret
owner.
Similarly, confidentiality and noncompetition agreements can be
useful in defining the confidentiality expectations of the employer,
proving that the trade secret owner used reasonable means to maintain
the secrecy of the information, and establishing that an employee was
aware of a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use.23° Most states
recognize and enforce noncompetition agreements as long as the re-
strictions are reasonable as to their geographical and temporal scope
and their restrictions on the scope of competitive activities.23' Citadel
226. Epstein & Levi, supra note 223, at 891, 905, 907-09.
227. Id. at 906; see UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985). For ad-
ditional suggestions as to practical steps to maintain secrecy, see MILGRIM, supra note 16, §
1.04.
228. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 25, at 73-74.
229. See generally KURT H. DECKER, COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE (2d ed. 1993).
230. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
231. See, e.g., EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1999);
Inflight Newspapers, Inc. v. Magazines In-Flight, LLC, 990 F. Supp. 119, 134, (E.D.N.Y.
1996); Habif, Arogeti & Wynne, P.C. v. Baggett, 498 S.E.2d 346, 350-54 (Ga. Ct. App.
1998); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (1981). A few states, however,
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should consider using confidentiality and noncompetition agreements
to protect its databases and other proprietary information.232
VII. CONCLUSION
Almost every business owns proprietary information that adds
value and provides a competitive advantage because it is not known
by competitors. Trade secret law is intended to ensure basic norms of
commercial ethics in a competitive market and to encourage invest-
ment in research by providing a means to capture the returns from the
development of successful innovations. 233  Accordingly, trade secret
law protects confidential and commercially valuable information from
being improperly disclosed or appropriated. 23  The dual nature of
trade secrets-as an intellectual property right and as a safeguard
against commercial immorality-makes the study of this area useful
for exploring legal and ethical aspects of using and protecting confi-
dential proprietary information, particularly when employees are in-
volved.
This case study is a tool to explore the law of trade secrets and the
ethical judgments confronting a business when trade secrets are in-
volved in a business decision. The fact scenario forming the basis for
this case study represents a set of circumstances not uncommon in
many trade secret disputes. Ultimately, by analyzing this case, one
should gain a deeper understanding of how to make ethical judgments
and manage legal risks when trade secrets are at stake.
generally prohibit such agreements. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (Deering 2005)
("Except as provided in this chapter, every contract by which anyone is restrained from en-
gaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void."); COLO.
REv. STAT. § 8-2-113(2) (2005) ("Any covenant not to compete which restricts the right of
any person to receive compensation for performance of skilled or unskilled labor for any em-
ployer shall be void, but this subsection (2) shall not apply to: ... (b) Any contract for the
protection of trade secrets .... "); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 217 (2005) ("Every contract by which
any one is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind, oth-
erwise than as provided by... this title.., is to that extent void.").
232. See Sharon K. Sandeen, A Contract by Any Other Name Is Still a Contract: Exam-
ining the Effectiveness of Trade Secret Clauses to Protect Databases, 45 IDEA 119, 144-50
(2005).
233. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).
234. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETs ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985).
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